10 Downing Street’s secret plan
By Andre Bagoo Sunday, August 11 2013
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Harold Wilson, UK Prime Minister, from 1964 to 1970, and again from 1974 to 1976...
Harold Wilson, UK Prime Minister, from 1964 to 1970, and again from 1974 to 1976...
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ON THE morning of Tuesday April 21, 1970, as Prime Minister Eric Williams met with advisers in Whitehall to continue efforts to get the Black Power emergency under control, thousands of miles away, in London, the UK’s Prime Minister Harold Wilson convened his cabinet at 10 Downing Street to consider a special request made by Williams.
A secret seven-page cabinet note of that UK meeting discloses what was on the agenda. At number three on the table of contents for the confidential printed note is an item labelled simply, “Oversea Affairs — Trinidad: Black Power Disturbances”.
According to the note, the Cabinet was briefed by George Thompson MP, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and Denis Healey MP, the Defence Secretary.
Thompson revealed that apparently hours after the situation arose, Williams asked Britain for help, “to assist him in restoring order”. This assistance was to be in two forms.
Firstly, Britain was asked to use its influence to get two countries — Nigeria and Tanzania — to send military help to Trinidad.
Secondly, Britain was asked to assist in transporting any troops sent by these countries. The details of this request by Williams for foreign assistance were never made known to the public of Trinidad and Tobago.
“The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster said that there have been a series of disturbances in Trinidad instigated by the Black Power movement,” the secret Cabinet note record, printed by the UK Cabinet secretariat in 1971, read. “The immediate occasion of these had been the trial of Trinidadian students in Canada on charges of arson; but there had been a long-standing background of economic discontent. On April 21, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Dr Eric Williams, had declared a state of emergency and had ordered the detention of 25 Black Power leaders: but ten of these had so far evaded arrest. The situation was complicated by the fact that at much the same time some 50 members of the Trinidad and Tobago Regiment, who sympathized with the Black Power movement, had mutinied and had established themselves in the former United States base at Chaguaramas, where they were holding 200 members of the Regiment as hostages.”
Thompson gave details of Williams’ request for assistance which — in 1970 - UK spokespersons had kept confidential, according to a contemporaneous news report at the time by Reuters. Defence Secretary Healey also disclosed Williams had requested help from Venezuela, Guyana and Jamaica.
Thompson told those around the large teal-coloured Cabinet room table, “At the outset Dr Williams had asked us to transmit requests to the Head of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria, General Gowon, and to the President of Tanzania, Mr. Nyerere, for the dispatch of troops to assist him in restoring order. He had also sought British assistance in transporting these troops to Trinidad and had asked us to supply light weapons to replace those seized by the mutineers.”
The UK Cabinet minister continued, “Dr Williams had subsequently decided not to pursue his approach to Nigeria and Tanzania: but urgent consideration had been given to our response if he pursued his request for arms.”
Thompson made clear that the UK still had deep economic interests in the island and its investment in the country was at the time a massive £150 million (an even more substantial sum if inflation is factored). The minister told the Cabinet, “Measures were being taken to ensure the safety of the 2,000 United Kingdom subjects in Trinidad. We had major economic interests in the island; and our investment there was estimated at about £150 million.”
According to the note, Thompson minced no words over the need to keep Williams on the UK’s side for the sake of its regional interests. Ironically, although Williams had turned to the UK for help, the UK Cabinet regarded him as a “strong and effective leader” who was key to their interests in the long-run.
The note reads, “Moreover, Dr Williams was a strong and effective leader, who had considerable influence in the African Commonwealth countries; and it was therefore important that we should do what we could to maintain our relationship with him and to avoid giving him any grounds of complaint as regards our response to his appeal.”
While at the time it had been reported that two British warships happened to be in Caribbean, the Secretary of State for Defence, Healey, confirmed this was no coincidence: they were sent specifically to deal with the situation in response to Williams request for help. The warships, two frigates, were mandated to remain, “out of sight”.
The record of the proceedings of April 21, 1970 reads, “The Defence Secretary said that one frigate, HMS Jupiter, had been dispatched to Trinidad, with orders to remain 30 miles offshore, and would be in position that night.”
Further, “A second frigate, HMS Sirius, would reach the island within the next two days and would also remain offshore and out of sight. HMS Jupiter carried a helicopter and could provide a naval landing party of two platoons trained in riot control. The complement of HMS Sirius included a detachment of Royal Marines.”
In the defence secretary’s assessment, the situation created by the mutiny in the Trinidad and Tobago Regiment was serious, since out of a total strength of 700 men 50 were taking an active part in the mutiny and 200 had been neutralised by the mutineers. The mutiny had also left the loyal troops critically short of arms.
In Healey’s view, “The arms which Dr Williams needed could be dispatched by midnight that night if he so requested: but he now seemed more likely to rely on supplies from the United States. He was also reported to have been promised reinforcements of 1,000 men from Venezuela. Guyana was considering supplying some weapons; but the response from Jamaica, to which Dr Williams had also appealed, was not yet known.”
The Cabinet note gives an account of the discussion which then occurred behind the closed white doors of the 10 Downing Street Cabinet Room, led by the UK prime minister. The key dilemma in the situation was balancing the fact that the incidents could potentially upset a region in which the UK still had key interests, with the need to not be seen to be meddling in the affairs of the newly independent Trinidad and Tobago.
“In discussion, it was suggested that, while the disturbances in Trinidad were on a small scale in terms of the forces involved, the political issues involved could be far-reaching,” the note records. “If we were to become involved in the internal security problems of an independent member of the Commonwealth, the consequences might be serious - the more so in that Dr. Williams’ Government had already incurred local criticism on the grounds of their alleged reliance on British and American support.”
The record discloses that the UK planned, if the situation warranted, to parachute a battalion into the country. It indicated the forces which could be provided by their two frigates were too small to be able to exercise any decisive influence on the maintenance of internal security in Trinidad, and stated that if the situation were to deteriorate to a point at which it became necessary to intervene in force to save British lives, a battalion of parachutists could be made available, which could reach Trinidad in two to four days.
Yet, the discussion around the table was ever mindful of political implications. Opinions stated that it was clearly desirable to avoid such a degree of involvement if possible; and British troops should be committed only in the last resort. Some concern was expressed whether Dr Williams’ assessment of the situation was over-optimistic. There had been some doubt whether he would in fact receive from the United States and elsewhere the supplies of arms and the assistance in which he appeared to be counting but the latest indications were that some arms from United States sources could already have reached him.
UK prime minister Harold Wilson, summing up the conversation, said that the Cabinet agreed on the importance of maintaining relations of confidence and sympathy with the Government of Trinidad and Tobago. A serious Black Power revolt would have serious repercussions elsewhere in the Caribbean; and, if these extended to the Associated States, it might prove impossible for Britain to avoid intervention.
Wilson continued, that on the other hand, Britain should clearly refrain from becoming directly involved in an internal security operation in an independent country. The situation, especially as regards the supply of arms to the Trinidad Government, would be closely watched; and, if immediate decisions were required, he himself would need to have discretion, in consultation with the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Defence Secretary, to take necessary action.
At the end of the meeting, the UK cabinet -
“(1) Took note, with approval, of the statements by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Defence Secretary and of the Prime Minister’s summing up of their discussion.
“(2) Agreed that the Prime Minister, in consultation with the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Defence Secretary, should have discretion to take appropriate action, including the supply of arms, if developments in Trinidad made it necessary to do so at short notice.”
