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*Journal of Sport and Social Issues* 2007; 31; 259

DOI: 10.1177/0193723507304643

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<http://jss.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/31/3/259>

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# Lord, Don't Stop the Carnival

## Trinidad and Tobago at the 2006 FIFA World Cup

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Trinidad and Tobago played in the men's football FIFA World Cup Finals in summer 2006 in Germany, becoming the smallest qualifier, according to population, in the history of the World Cup. In this article, the questions are posed of how such a small nation has achieved this and what the contribution of Jack Warner has been to this story. The analysis is informed by a critical, investigative framework that combines socio-logical synthesis with qualitative forms of reportage (both academic and journalistic) and interpretation, documentary sources and focused observation (at sporting encounters), and interviews and dialogues with FIFA personnel. The article demonstrates that the football administrations of Trinidad and Tobago and the regional governing body CONCACAF have been used to further the personal and business ambitions of individuals and that the carnivalesque public face of the sport masks processes and dynamics of self-aggrandizement and individual profiteering.

**Keywords:** *Trinidad and Tobago; Carnival and popular culture; CONCACAF; Jack Warner*

Trinidad and Tobago played in the men's football FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) World Cup Finals in Germany in the summer of 2006. This was seen as a triumph for the smaller members of the world governing body and for the organization that has controlled and developed football in the Caribbean and the Central Americas, the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association of Football (CONCACAF). When the country defeated Bahrain in November 2005 in a playoff for a place in the World Cup Finals, it became the smallest qualifier, in terms of national population, in the history of the World Cup.

**Author's Note:** This article is a developed version of the second and third sections which were presented as "FIFA, CONCACAF and the Caribbean: A critical assessment" to a conference audience in 2003. The author is grateful to the Institute of Latin American Studies (since August 2004, the Institute for the Study of the Americas), University of London, for the opportunity to address the conference on "Football in the Americas," held in London October 30-31, 2003. Particular thanks go to Professor James Dunkerley, director of the Institute, and Dr. Rory Miller of the University of Liverpool Management School, for their invitation, support, and encouragement; and to all participants at the conference for their generally provocative and often perceptive responses. Many of the papers from the London conference will be published as *Football in the Americas: Fútbol, futebol, soccer* (Rory M. Miller & Liz Crolley, Eds., London: Institute for the Study of the Americas).

In 1998, another small Caribbean country, Jamaica, qualified for the World Cup Finals in France and generated extensive publicity and coverage for its happy-go-lucky approach to the event; nicknamed the Reggae Boyz, the team acted as a catalyst for public displays of Jamaican popular music. The football event legitimated a public celebration of Caribbean popular cultural identity. France was no great distance for U.K.-based Jamaican football fans to travel, and the match against eventual semifinalists Croatia, in Lens, afforded such fans the opportunity to stage mini-carnivals in the host town and the environs of the stadium. Effusive street musicians adorned the public thoroughfares of the town, serenading the visiting fans in the best traditions of reggae. Metro stations and walkways in Paris were similarly enlivened. At its games in Germany in 2006, Trinidad and Tobago fans recreated this Caribbean carnival atmosphere. In both cases, much was made of the playful public culture of the fans in their support of diasporic configurations of cosmopolitan players. In this article, questions are posed regarding how such a small nation and its parent confederation have emerged on the world footballing stage and who, in the case of Trinidad and Tobago, has prospered alongside this success.

Ryan (1972) has identified six major periods in the history of Trinidad and Tobago.<sup>1</sup> Post-World War II, from 1946, constitutes the formative “modern period” of a fifth phase and a postindependence sixth phase: this is when the country established universal suffrage, recognized trades unions, granted authority to elected officials, and in general embodied an “intensification of the movement for self-government and federation” (p. 5). Portuguese Creole Albert Gomes was a big influence until 1955, followed by Eric Williams and the People’s National Movement, and the achievement of the country’s independence in 1962. There is no recognition, in Ryan’s account, of the political significance of sport. C. L. R. James, celebrated writer, critic, and politician, and Sir Learie Constantine, cricketing hero of the embryonic nation, feature in Ryan’s account purely as writers or political activists (and, in Constantine’s case, as businessman too). There is little evidence, therefore, in mainstream historical accounts, of the cultural significance of sport and popular culture in the evolution of the country and the making of the nation. Some writers (Lopez, 1984; St. Pierre, 1973a) recognized the importance of C. L. R. James in the cultural politics of cricket, but mainstream historical and political accounts have made little of such matters. Sport, as a form of cultural politics, can remain tangential: a form of civil society with some connections with the sphere of the state but a defining and persisting degree of autonomy that translates into an essential unaccountability. This creates a space in which complex cultural dynamics and strong historical legacies can be exploited in favor of particular personal, economic, or political interests.

## Context and Method

In this article, therefore, the Trinidad and Tobago appearance at Germany in 2006 is placed in its historical and cultural contexts, and the different dimensions of the historic

sporting achievement subjected to sociological scrutiny and cultural critique. The analysis is informed by a critical, investigative framework (Sugden & Tomlinson, 1999a) that combines sociological synthesis with qualitative forms of reportage (both academic and journalistic) and interpretation; and by the use of documentary sources and focused observation (at sporting encounters), along with the insights of the flâneur (Bairner, 2006). Caribbean fans were observed in Paris and Lens in 1998, facilities and events were visited and attended in Trinidad and Tobago in October and November 2002 and in London in 2006, and the Trinidadian team's progress in Germany in June 2006 was monitored.<sup>2</sup> Interviews and dialogue with numerous FIFA committee members inform the analysis, and the article also draws on confidential legal documents relating to FIFA affairs, practices, and finances.

## **Soccer Politics in the Caribbean and Central and North America**

CONCACAF is one of six member confederations of the world governing body of football, FIFA. It is the most recently constituted of the five major confederations, dating from 1961, with the minnow among FIFA waters being the Oceania Football Confederation, founded half a decade later. But by 2002, CONCACAF could boast 35 member national associations, and 5 associate members against Oceania's 10 members and 4 associate members. CONCACAF could also wield power at FIFA meetings, with two long-standing members of the ruling body's executive committee, and guaranteed slots for 3 of its members in the finals of World Cups: In June 2006, Trinidad and Tobago accompanied the United States and Mexico to Germany. Europe's Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA), founded in 1954 and with 52 members in 2006, had 13 places for which to compete for the 2006 finals (with the hosts, Germany, qualifying automatically). Africa's Confédération Africaine de Football, founded in 1957, had 5 places for its 53 members. Asia's AFC (Asian Football Confederation), established in 1954, had 4 guaranteed places for its 40-plus members. The oldest established confederation, CONMEBOL (Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol), dating from 1916, with just 10 members, claimed the highest proportional share of the allocation, with 5 guaranteed slots (and the prospect of a sixth, in a playoff with the winner of the Oceania competition). Oceania had no guaranteed places for its 11 members in the finals, although in 2006 Australia qualified by beating Uruguay in the playoff match. With Mexico and the United States dominating the qualification phases, there has been a reward for a high-performing smaller nation that could clinch the third spot: Canada and Haiti are notable examples. When Trinidad and Tobago confirmed its qualification in Germany in 2006, it was guaranteed an enthusiastic response from not just its own local media and fans. The two-island nation was hardly famed for its prowess at football, and the success of the "Soca Warriors"—successors to the fondly remembered Strike Squad of 1989 that missed out on qualification for the 1990 World Cup Finals in Italy—was a ready-made story for the world media.

CONCACAF is made up of three intraregional unions: the North American Football Union (NAFU), with 3 members; the Central American Football Union (UNCAF), with 7 members; and the Caribbean Football Union (CFU), with 25 members and 5 associate members. With the United States and Mexico dominating the first two of these in playing levels and obvious scales of resourcing, the Caribbean union has sought to profile itself by more effective representation in confederation and FIFA politics by campaigning for aid, development, and football education and by aspiring to establish infrastructure and administration capable of hosting cross-confederation FIFA events. Regardless of the level of competitive effectiveness of its members in international competitions, CONCACAF has established itself as a major influence in wider football politics.

This is consonant with the way that FIFA politics developed in the postcolonial period throughout the second half of the twentieth century. FIFA statutes demand that a two thirds majority must carry changes in these processes; presidential elections demand the same majority. World Cup locations, since the 1970s, have been decided by votes inside the 24-man FIFA Executive Committee. In 1996, FIFA's Directory showed that CONCACAF had only 2 members, the aging Mexican Guillermo Cañedo as senior vice president and confederation president Jack Warner, of Trinidad and Tobago. By 2001, as reported in the FIFA Directory, this had stabilized, but Warner had become a vice president (Cañedo had died), and Chuck Blazer, general secretary and treasurer of CONCACAF (and in charge of its marketing portfolio), had retained his place as a member of the executive committee. In 2007, both Warner and Blazer were still firmly in their Executive Committee seats, joined by a third CONCACAF representative: Isaac David Sasso Sasso of Costa Rica. CONCACAF's own report of 2002, reported in more detail below, was also claiming much more widespread influence in FIFA affairs throughout the world body's committee structures and organization.

Although 3 votes out of 24 in Executive Committee business might not indicate huge influence, the alliances within FIFA politics are the most indicative of the *modus operandi* of world football politics. For, as confirmed to me by Chuck Blazer, CONCACAF has been able to guarantee a block vote at vital presidential elections in Paris in 1998 and at Seoul in 2002.

[The confederation] can continue to deliver block votes where are [sic] a common interest is concerned. This is certainly the case in the presidency and there are other issues as well, but this is one of the few that is voted on by the membership in full. (C. Blazer, personal communication, May 25, 2002)

This level of guaranteed backing has been vital to the FIFA president, Joseph "Sepp" Blatter, who achieved the presidency in 1998 (see Sugden & Tomlinson, 1999b: chapter 9; Jennings, 2002a) and retained the position in 2002 (Jennings & Lipton, 2002; Tomlinson, 2002). If, in 1998, say 31 CONCACAF votes had backed the European

candidate, the Swede Lennart Johansson of UEFA, voting would have been more like 111 votes to Johansson and 80 votes to Blatter—the exact reverse of the count, still not a two thirds majority but enough of a margin, as it was to lead the UEFA president to concede defeat. In 2002, CONCACAF had brought several associate members into the fold of full membership, and Blazer and Walker could deliver Blatter 35 votes. Cameroonian Issa Hayatou, president of the African confederation, was the challenger to incumbent Blatter but mustered a mere 56 votes to Blatter's 139. For the sake of argument and illustration, though, should CONCACAF have backed Hayatou, the voting would have been 91 for the Cameroonian and 104 for Blatter—way off the required two thirds winning margin for the Swiss president.

The main point about this vote gathering and the mobilization of block votes is obvious but utterly critical: A national association, such as Turks and Caicos Islands, has as much weight in the democratic electoral process and the election of a president as has any historic or prominent footballing nation, such as Argentina, Brazil, France, or Italy. This is king-making power, and Blazer and Warner have made no secret of how close to the throne they wanted to be and of the means that they might adopt to stay there. Within such a climate, too, it is unsurprising that some delegates may not have always been able to turn up and register a vote, as Andrew Jennings (2006a) has revealed. In a devastating BBC investigative report for the program *Panorama*, Jennings exposed the democratic sham of FIFA processes: The representative of Haiti who turned up to vote at the Equinox in Paris in 1998 was not the president, the general secretary, or any legitimately approved delegate: Haiti football federation president Dr. Jean-Marie ("Jean Mary" in FIFA's 1996 handbook) Kyss "was turned back by the government gunmen at Port au Prince airport who wouldn't let him board his flight" (Jennings, 2006b, p. 311)—it was a plant, a personal friend of CONCACAF's Jack Warner, who took Kyss's seat and cast the absent Haitian's vote: "It had to be a Black man. A Black man who could be relied upon to keep his mouth shut. Warner knew just the fellow" (Jennings, 2006b, p. 90): this was Neville Ferguson, a Warner aide and longtime friend from their days at teachers' training college together in Trinidad in the 1960s.

When FIFA was forced to probe this fraud, it operated via a secret disciplinary hearing, even condemning Kyss as in breach of FIFA regulations but as no longer an official of the Haiti federation, so no longer "subject to FIFA's jurisdiction" (Jennings, 2006b, p. 314). In the same letter to Jennings, FIFA president Blatter wrote. "Neville Ferguson has been reprimanded" (Jennings, 2006b, p. 314). No detail of the nature of the reprimand was forthcoming, and Ferguson remained active in football organization in the CONCACAF region. That Jack Warner was clearly able to ride this particular storm of vote fixing testifies to the reciprocity of deal making in the murky waters of the region's football politics. Before returning to the *modus vivendi* of CONCACAF rhetoric and practices, it is useful to consider the context of Warner's rise in the sporting hierarchy of Trinidad and Tobago.

## Soccer in Trinidad and Tobago: Organizational History

C. L. R. James (1963/1976), Trinidad-born Marxist literary critic, cricket writer, and political activist, described the cricket institutions of his homeland as bastions of class privilege, racial prejudice, and cultural segregation, which for half a century "had been allowed to fester under the surface, a source of corruption and hypocrisy" (p. 243). In 1960, in an open letter to the Queen's Park Cricket Club, controlling body of the country's cricket, James contrasted cricket's organization by an unaccountable "private club" (p. 234) with the way that the country's Football Association was run, as a "democratically elected body representing the . . . clubs and associations of the country" (p. 234). James's brother, Eric James, was secretary of the West Indian Football Association at the time: "Everyone knew that the Football Associations which he was responsible for were run on strictly democratic lines, all clubs and all classes represented, and were supported by the entire community . . . [representing] the perfect integration of all elements in the community" (p. 242). James offered no detail to substantiate this claim. A more detailed account of the development of professional football in Trinidad (McCree, 2000) indicates more tensions than James's version and so questions the cultural critic's interpretation of the democratic and community ideals underlying the organization of the game.

"Amateurism . . . emerged as the dominant meaning system in the initial formative years" of soccer in Trinidad and Tobago (McCree, 2000, p. 207). The game had been introduced to the country by British expatriates working in "the sugar and nascent oil industries, the military, the civil service, the clergy and in the commercial and financial sectors" (McCree, 2000, p. 204). The game was therefore based in a solid middle-class culture that underlay the dominant amateurist form. The organizational framework for the administration of the game was the Trinidad Amateur Football Association, which dropped the "Amateur" from its title in 1953 and sought to be more representative of the whole island, less elite-based, and more democratic, moving away from the "amateur-gentleman" orientation, as McCree terms it. The Trinidad Football Association became the Trinidad and Tobago Football Association (TTFA) in the mid-1960s, changing "Association" to "Federation" in 1999. Rather than uniting Trinidadian football, though, the 1953 change stimulated the formation of the Port of Spain Football League in the north of the island. When professionalization was developed, from the late 1960s, several pre-emergent, and aborted, efforts nevertheless indicated the potential of a commercialized form with a spectator base. One of the four initiatives reviewed by McCree was the Caribbean Professional Football League, launched in 1977 but essentially blocked by the TTFA. McCree (2000, p. 210) referred to the TTFA's "then secretary" and his opposition to professionalization by any independent body that might threaten the association's authority and power. This then-secretary is quoted as a "former secretary" 16 years on, recalling the rationale for opposition to professionalizing initiatives: the association "was negative, was lukewarm, because they felt threatened. They felt

that, of course, the limited resources would have been dissipated. Generally speaking, they felt that this was a rival organization and this was the best thing to do" (McCree, 2000, p. 210).

Several years later, in the early 1980s, a further initiative, the Premier Soccer League (PSL), was similarly thwarted. McCree again quotes the "former secretary": "Because of the nature of its formation, its background and so on, it obviously was a threat . . . this guy was trying to undermine the TTFA because he had resources and therefore we had to fight it" (McCree, 2000, p. 212). The association brought in the world governing body FIFA to support its strategy of blocking any rival or threatening football initiative, despite evidence that the PSL initiative was prompted by "a great measure of dissatisfaction with the ruling TTFA" (McCree, 2000, p. 210). The foci of dissatisfaction were poor playing standards, little material support for players, the lack of business standards of the association, and the opaqueness and inaccessibility of the ruling body's decision-making processes. The "former secretary" was assistant secretary of the TTFA from 1973 to 1974 and secretary from 1974 to 1990, wholly oppositional to the three major initiatives to professionalize the game. This bulwark against the development and modernization of the game in Trinidad and Tobago—unnamed by McCree in his unnecessarily wary academic analysis—was none other than Jack Warner. In the late 1980s, it was not Warner who stimulated the promising Strike Squad of youngsters that narrowly missed out on qualification for Italia '90. It was Trinidadian coach Everard Gally Cummings, who introduced a structure and foundation to the game, urged changes to the cultural style of play, encouraged a more professional approach among players, and worked to cultivate more enthusiasm for the sport among the general public (P. Smith, *Trinidad Express*, personal communication, November 14, 2002). This account is hardly a testimonial to the achievements of Warner at the helm of the national association or federation. On becoming president of CONCACAF in 1990, Warner suddenly became extremely interested in the development of the commercial potential of the game in his home country, with aspirations—abandoned in 2004—to make his Joe Public Football Club "the Manchester United of the Caribbean" (Jennings, 2006b, p. 149).

### Claims for CONCACAF's Contribution

Although organized football associations in the region dated from the early twentieth century (Guyana 1902, Haiti 1904, Trinidad and Tobago 1908, Jamaica 1910, Barbados 1910, Canada 1912, and the United States 1913), as one official CONCACAF publication (2002, p. 1) stated: "Up until recently, football in CONCACAF wallowed in a sea of mediocrity, and was considered more as a pastime than a competitive sport requiring excellence." CONCACAF had been dominated in its early days by Mexican interests and the influential figure of Guillermo Cañedo, though based in Guatemala City. In 1971, the then-president of FIFA, Sir Stanley Rous, addressed a



CONCACAF congress in Caracas and called for the administration (though the president and the secretary general of the confederation were not present at the address) to “see that all financial resources were used to best effect,” warning too that “bad administration, which was out of touch and spent money in the wrong ways” (Sugden & Tomlinson, 1998, p. 205) was wasteful: Clearly the confederation was perceived as unaccountable, self-serving, and more corrupt than naïve. Rous also questioned refereeing appointments and noted the lack of representativeness in the confederation’s committee and decision-making processes. Nevertheless, 3 years later delegates from CONCACAF national associations were to play an important supportive part in Brazilian Dr. João Havelange’s successful challenge to Rous for the FIFA presidency. In 1990, Jack Warner of Trinidad and Tobago won the CONCACAF presidency, and the confederation relocated to Port of Spain, Trinidad. Warner was elected on a manifesto that stressed grassroots development and provision of support for more effective national associations in wider football politics; within a decade, 72 persons from the confederation were on FIFA’s 21 standing committees, boosting Warner’s and his confederation colleagues’ profile in FIFA’s top committee.

The 2002 CONCACAF portrait presents a black-and-white developmental history of the confederation. Before 1990, things were black. Executive meetings were held just once a year in Guatemala City. At these meetings, it is claimed that unilateral decisions were simply rubber stamped, without discussion among executive committee members. Documents were not submitted to members for approval. Congresses were not accessible to Caribbean representatives, so few Caribbean members became involved in any capacity, either practical or administrative. Employing the French term for a flowering or bursting out, *éclatement*, the CONCACAF’s 2002 document notes that after 1990, “all of this changed, and continues to change” (p. 1). And all from the moment Trinidadian Jack Warner came into power at the confederation: “Metaphorically speaking, the football in CONCACAF is bursting at the seams!” (CONCACAF, 2002, p. 1). What may well have been bursting at the seams, a decade after Warner won the presidency, were the pockets of the CONCACAF bureaucracy, and the Warner family in particular.

In 1990, Warner’s 10-point manifesto included the following objectives:

1. to mobilize the Caribbean zone;
2. to create more competitions;
3. to relocate the confederation headquarters to New York City, with suboffices in Guatemala City and Port of Spain;
4. to establish credible sponsors;
5. to create effective committees;
6. to improve communication;
7. to participate more fully in FIFA’s activities;
8. to participate in more competitions, including those of FIFA;
9. to amend the constitution of the confederation; and
10. to establish the Dr. João Havelange Centre of Excellence.

Evaluating the eighth of these goals, CONCACAF cites FIFA president Joseph S. Blatter's comments on Trinidad and Tobago's staging of FIFA's Under-17 World Championship in 2001. Matches were relayed to more than 130 countries, from five "packed stadia" presenting "world-class football," and Blatter enthused, "FIFA would like to congratulate Trinidad and Tobago on these superb achievements, giving special mention to the driving force behind the scenes, Jack A. Warner" (CONCACAF, 2002, p. 8).

CONCACAF also reported on the progress in the confederation on FIFA's GOAL project, a football development program targeting small countries that prioritizes infrastructure, administration, education, youth football, and/or "other areas based on the needs of the national association" (CONCACAF, 2002, p. 14). The first completed project in the Caribbean was the National Centre for Football Development in Nassau, Bahamas. On land leased by the government, the Bahamas Football Association constructed a natural playing surface and a security fence, with GOAL funding of US\$500,000 and a further boost of US\$76,206 from FIFA's Financial Assistance Program. Aruba was following suit: US\$448,500 for an artificial playing surface with floodlights in Noord. Haiti had completed its technical center in Port au Prince, with US\$547,883 of GOAL money. Money was pouring in to the smaller nations. Trinidad and Tobago was doing especially well. With CONCACAF based there, it might have seemed that it was relatively well off for facilities: Regardless, US\$400,000 was still found for a planned technical center (FIFA, 2002). Although all of these developments were taking place in a confederation like CONCACAF in the Third World, any players with promise would already be on the way to the riches of the First World. In Africa (Runciman, 2006) as well as globally (Elliott, 2006), the postcolonial legacy for the emergent football nations might be both a migration of talent and a stalled development at home, the latter nevertheless ripe for pickings for business opportunists.

### **Behind the Public Claims: An Investigative Perspective<sup>3</sup>**

The most eminent contemporary investigative journalist upholding the principles of investigative and classically muckraking work in the journalistic field, applied to the sphere of international sport, is Andrew Jennings ([www.transparencyinsport.org](http://www.transparencyinsport.org)). With Vyv Simson, drawing on their joint pedigree as investigative reporters for the United Kingdom's *The Sunday Times* and Granada Television's *World in Action*, they shook the world of Juan Antonio Samaranch's International Olympic Committee (IOC) with the publication in 1992 of *The Lords of the Rings—Power, Money & Drugs in the Modern Olympics*: "This book discloses what you are not allowed to see on your TV and what the newspapers do not tell you about the Olympics and world sport" (Simson & Jennings, 1992, p. ix). Simson and Jennings, having researched Mafia operations and terrorism, stated that "the world of Olympic, amateur sport has proved the hardest to penetrate. Never before have we found it so difficult to obtain

on-the-record interviews, documents and original sources. . . . This is our discovery about the world of Olympic sport. It is a secretive, *élite* domain” dominated by the “men who manipulate sport for their own ends” (pp. ix, x). Samaranch’s fascist, Franco-ist past was fully exposed, and insightful work into the corporate financing of Olympic expansion (Wilson, 1988) explained in explosive detail. Jennings continued his investigations into the IOC and the Olympics, with exposure of corrupt refereeing practices in Olympic boxing competition (Jennings, 1996), and of individuals and institutions involved and complicit in corrupt practices concerning the bidding for and the staging of the Olympics (Jennings & Sambrook, 2000): In particular, Atlanta and Salt Lake City bribes and U.S. legal investigations into the issues were covered in detail, with Samaranch in the dock and American political veteran Henry Kissinger effecting a cover-up. Jennings’s brilliance in locating documents and evidence and accessing sources, networks, and whistleblowers is an inspiration to both journalistic and academic research constituencies, for which the official line has too often been the convenient way forward and the easy option. After his Olympic treble, and supported and funded by the sports editor of the *Daily Mail*, Colin Gibson, Jennings turned his investigative skills toward the operations of FIFA, culminating in his confirmation and further exposure of the endemic administrative and financial malpractices of the world governing body (see, e.g., Jennings, 2002b, 2002c). It is this phase of Jennings’s oeuvre on which this section of the article draws as well as related previous collaborative work by the current author (Sugden & Tomlinson, 1999b, 2003). In the context of Trinidad and Tobago, the figure of Jack Warner draws the investigative lens toward him. Four examples of forms of self-aggrandizement are cited here, prior to the presentation of a summative commentary on Warner’s affairs by former FIFA general secretary Michel Zen-Ruffinen.

## Manipulation

In its warm-up schedule for the 2006 World Cup Finals, Trinidad and Tobago played a friendly international fixture against Iceland. This took place in West London, at Loftus Road, the ground of Queens Park Rangers. Iceland’s Football Association president, Eggert Magnússon—a biscuit magnate soon to become the owner of struggling English Premier League club West Ham United on the other side of London—penned a message (p. 9). TTFF President Oliver Camps had no such opportunity. Instead, on page 3, the first textual content of the match magazine, football fans were offered a “warm welcome from the FIFA Vice President, Mr. Austin Jack Warner.” On a freezing English February night, Warner reminded England-based Trinidadians and other football enthusiasts of the popular cultural legacy in which the footballing success of the twin-island nation was anchored:

Today, the people of Trinidad and Tobago are dancing in the streets, for it is Carnival Time at home, and the sounds of steel bands playing our infectious Soca music are ringing through the islands. A small piece of that Carnival spirit is here at Loftus Road tonight, as English-based steel bands provide the rhythm for our players.

Warner then trotted out his national side's support slogan: "Small Country–Big Passion." And the passion on this bitter midwinter evening was palpable, prompting one observer (Mitchell, 2006, p. 26) to forecast that Trinidad and Tobago would generate a level of support comparable to Cameroon's at the 1990 World Cup. Appealing to his country's cultural traditions, though, Warner did so from no official position within the TTFF. Yet Magnússon picked out Warner in his program notes: "A special greeting goes to my friend Jack Warner, the president of the T&T Football Association. In my mind, a lot of the aforementioned success (qualification for Germany 2006) can be put down to his good work within the FA and the world of football." Experienced Dutch football coach Leo Boneshaker also knew who was in charge: "We will have a lot of meetings with Mr. Warner and the management team of the federation to arrange everything perfectly over the months of May and June." Oliver Camps was president of the federation according to FIFA's 1996 directory and still president according to CONCACAF's Web site on March 28, 2007; administrative and managerial continuity was indicated in the loyal vice presidential tenure of Raymond Kim Tee across the same period. But Warner is a man who could fix FIFA elections, substituting yes-men for genuine delegates. Camps and Kim Tee were unlikely to undermine one of the FIFA vice president's moments of glory: Warner's continuing involvement in the (now high-profile) affairs of the national side was testimony to his abusive manipulation of institutional authority. He was not tempted to correct the side's current coach, or the Icelandic businessman, for there was also hard work to be done soon, money to be made. The association with the Soca Warriors was looking very lucrative for Warner.

### Conflict of Interests

In the wake of Warner's dealings in World Cup 2006 tickets, his colleagues on FIFA's executive committee reprimanded him. At the end of 2005, the press in Trinidad and Tobago had been demanding to know more about the company, Simpaul Travel, that had much of the business in tickets and travel to the forthcoming World Cup. In his book *Foul! The Secret World of FIFA* (Jennings, 2006b) and his brilliant reportage for the UK's *Daily Mail*, Andrew Jennings, has constructed the narrative of Warner's conflict of interests on this issue. When the *Trinidad Express* reporter Lasana Liburd asked Oliver Camps, president of the national federation, for details on this, he "replied that the federation had banned him from speaking about the tickets allocation" (Jennings, 2006b, p. 332). Who imposed the gag? This story was not going to lie down, though. The Simpaul connection had been identified earlier in relation to business allocated for the Under-17 World Championship in Trinidad and Tobago. Jennings closes *Foul!* with an update (2006b, pp. 331-336). Undoubtedly, Warner, as established above as not an official of any sort, was still exerting extensive control of the federation's business and activities. Simpaul Travel was confirmed as in the ownership of Warner, his wife, and two of his sons, Daryan and Daryll. The "biggest single beneficiary" of the federation's allocation of 10,749 Germany 2006 tickets, with 1,774, was Simpaul Travel (Jennings, 2006b, p. 336): The company also

got hold of a further 5,400 tickets. FIFA's February (2006) Ethics Committee had recognized both a conflict of interest and a violation of FIFA's Code of Ethics in Warner's dealings. A mere month later, Warner told his colleagues on the Executive Committee that he had sold his interest: "The committee absolved him and closed the case" (Jennings, 2006b, p. 336). The case and related cases were not closed for long, though. In an Ernst & Young (Zurich) letter to FIFA, dated July 8 (personal communication, P. Coats & T. Stenz, July 8, 2006),<sup>4</sup> Coats and Stenz documented ticket movements and concluded, in one case, that tickets ordered by Jack Warner from the FIFA ticket office "were transferred or resold into the secondary market in breach of the 2006 FIFA World Cup Germany™ Ticketing General Terms and Conditions": A million-dollar profit for the Warners was identified (Jennings, 2006c). Perhaps Warner was now in too tight a corner, with crime-buster Lord Sebastian Coe newly appointed as the first chair of a new, independent FIFA ethics commission. But Warner was off limits for former Olympic champion Lord Coe, as the ethics committee would rule only on new cases (Mackay, 2006; Palmer, 2006)—and in ethical terms, Warner could hardly be categorized as anything but a very old case indeed. By December, FIFA's disciplinary committee could let Warner off the hook: There was no case to answer; it was not Warner's fault that his son had done these ticket deals (CBC Sports, 2006). Marcel Mathier headed up the 19-man committee, adding that Warner should be scolded; Blatter stated that Warner had received the committee's censure, had made no comment, and concluded that now the case was wholly closed. In March 2007, Andrew Jennings (2007) reported that FIFA's Executive Committee had secretly fined Warner's son Daryl a million dollars (Jennings, 2007) and banned the Warner family travel company from dealing in tickets.

## Self-Promotion

One of the pledges made in Warner's manifesto when he gained the CONCACAF presidency was to establish a Center of Excellence for football in the confederation. For Warner, this was best situated a few miles down the road from his luxury home in the north of Trinidad, far from the geographical center of the regional confederation, and also a short drive—mere minutes—from both the CONCACAF office and the national football federation's office in Trinidad's capital, Port of Spain. Andrew Jennings describes how Warner budgeted US\$16 million for the project, comprising a football stadium, outdoor pool, practice fields, administrative offices, conference facilities and hall, and accommodation for up to 50 participants on courses, conferences, or meetings (Jennings, 2006b, pp. 145-148). This was provided by FIFA but never repaid by the confederation: FIFA chose to "reimburse" the loan to itself, thus wiping out the debt. Warner even went on to charge exorbitant fees for FIFA-based courses and events. Opened in May 1998 by outgoing FIFA president Havelange—whose tatty-looking bust adorns the cage-like structure that dominates the driveway at the entrance of the site—the center was soon in use for events way off the football agenda. A Miss Universe Pageant was staged there in 1999, with the offices for

that organization located at the Trump Tower in New York, along with the office of Warner's general secretary, Chuck Blazer (Jennings, 2006b, p. 148). The Miss Universe event was, in 2004-2005, co-owned by the Trump Organization and the American TV station NBC. This was the kind of global business that Warner sought to place in his football development center.

Visiting the center in 2002, it was notable how little football activity was under way and how little business or administrative momentum occurred throughout the building: The GOAL office, for instance, was deserted. There was little in the way of reception. This was hardly surprising until a glance at the tariff for use of the facility provided the explanation. If you wanted use of the main field for a family sport day, the starting rate was \$3,000 plus VAT: and make sure you all walked there—the car park rental was \$2,500. A “tentative schedule” for 2002 referred to monthly activities (bar July) in sports medicine, coaching courses in Spanish, refereeing workshops, advanced marketing, workshops on goalkeeper coaching and women's football, and a seminar on contracts and negotiations. The women's football workshop had been scheduled for October, just before one other event that packed the local population into the conference hall. On Saturday night November 2, 2002, citizens of Trinidad were invited to “enjoy an evening with 12 of the most beautiful women in Trinidad and Tobago” at the Dr. João Havelange Centre of Excellence, Macoya Road, Tunapuna, at a mere \$150 (Trinidad currency) per head for a general unreserved place. Scantly clad women lined up for photo shoots to model sponsors' exotic costumes. They came from Arima, Belmont, Brazil, Maraval, Princes Town, San Fernando, St. Augustine, Tacarigua, Woodbrook, and Tunapuna itself for this “crowning of Miss Trinidad and Tobago for Miss Universe 2003.” The event was presented by Caribbean Communications Network Limited, the dominant national media organization, thus guaranteeing Warner national exposure for his center in a form of performance excellence far removed from any CONCACAF or FIFA mission.

## Ingrained Deception

Trinidad and Tobago hosted the FIFA Under-17 World Championship in 2001, building four new stadiums for the event, including the Dwight Yorke Stadium in Tobago, named after the then-Manchester United star who was to lead his national side to Germany in 2006; and renovating a fifth, the national stadium in Port of Spain, named after athlete Hasely Crawford. FIFA president Blatter, reported the following in CONCACAF's *Confederation News* (2001, p. 2): “With world-class football, packed stadia, widespread television coverage and an extraordinary atmosphere, the FIFA Under-17 World Championship Trinidad and Tobago presented by JVC was a huge success in every way.” Not for the hosts on the field of play, though, with the Trinidad and Tobago side exiting the tournament in the first phase. But Blatter praised “awe-inspiring” crowds and the successful transmission of the action to 130 countries. Blatter yanked up the hyperbole: “FIFA would like to congratulate Trinidad and Tobago on these superb achievements, giving special mention to the driving force behind the scenes,

Jack A. Warner” (CONCACAF, 2001, p. 2), whose “expert guidance” had underpinned the national federation’s efforts. Warner’s expert guidance was also valued by his travel company and complicit media interests beaming at the expanding Caribbean and Central American market. A little more than a year from Blatter’s encomium to Warner, you could sample minimal crowds in the Hasely Crawford stadium (November 15, 2002) for the national team’s game with St. Kitts in qualifiers for the regional 2003 Football Confederation Gold Cup Tournament. Asked whether the ticket was the right one, the gatekeeper confirmed that it indeed was: Although the ticket was for Trinidad and Tobago versus Panama for Wednesday, November 15 2000, in the qualifying schedule for the 2002 FIFA World Cup. At another match in the same Gold Cup cycle, at the sparsely attended Havelange Centre for Excellence, a ticket for that same fixture of 2 years beforehand was again handed over for the admission fee. This routine scam is second nature in the football administration of Warner’s nation and region.

### **The Warner Family**

In May 2002, Michel Zen-Ruffinen, general secretary of FIFA, compiled a confidential document condemning Blatter for mismanagement of FIFA affairs, particularly in relation to financial and legal matters.<sup>5</sup> One section of this document, presented to FIFA executive committee members and the basis of a submission to a Swiss prosecutor, was entitled “The Warner Family,” reading, “The President has constantly taken decisions which are favourable to the economical interests of Jack Warner and some of his family members, and thus are contrary to the financial interests of FIFA.” These included Warner receiving World Cup TV rights for the 1990, 1994, and 1998 competitions in his region, via another body, for \$1 (under Havelange’s regime) and pressuring Blatter successfully for the 2002 rights (see Sugden & Tomlinson, 2003, p. 250); Warner awarding the business for travel of teams to the U-17 World Championship in Trinidad and Tobago in 2001 to his own travel agency; FIFA paying the company SEMTOR, of which one of Warner’s sons was a top executive, for an invoice for an IT contract for almost US\$2 million, for work estimated by FIFA’s own experts at no more than half a million dollars; Warner reporting that the U-17 competition cost US\$8.21 million and getting his way despite the set budget of US\$4.5 million (and noting too that the final calculation contained errors); and, finally, Warner placing a second son in the position of chief executive of the Havelange Centre of Excellence.

Turning this investigative gaze on the culture and politics of football in Trinidad and Tobago highlights the ways in which developmental positions and expansionist potential can be exploited. It is inadequate to look solely at the game and the institutions that purportedly support the game and its development, and talk of these in an abstract language of formal organizational analysis; or to accept at anything like face value the pronouncements of many of those who hold positions of power. It is always important, too, to locate the individual sport in the wider cultural context, and in the case of Trinidad and Tobago, this includes the Carnival. This primary



preoccupation in the sphere of the popular offers a key to understanding how Jack Warner can try to speak in a populist fashion for the people of his country while making the most of his individual opportunities for self-advancement and personal profiteering.

## Carnival and the Popular Cultural Sphere

Soca Warriors

We want ah Goal

Visit Trinidad & Tobago and you'll discover we've got an overwhelming passion for a lot more than just our football!

It's how we play Carnival...

It's how we play football...

It's how we live!<sup>6</sup>

Studies of popular cultural phenomena such as Trinidad's predominant carnival reveal a nation at play within the realms of an inclusive and all-embracing cultural practice and form. Wood's (1968) study located the historical roots of this phenomenon. Slavery (1834)<sup>7</sup> and apprenticeship (1838) were abolished in the crown Colony, after which Trinidad experienced the "unifying" influences of the pre-Lenten Catholic festival Carnival.<sup>8</sup> Wood could claim, a century after Carnival's origins that it has the approval of the vast majority of Trinidadians, for whom it is

the unique manifestation of their culture. It provides what Walter Bagehot called "the nice and pretty events" needed by all countries as a symbol of their nationhood as well as continuing to be, whether the participants realize it or not, a release for all kinds of pent-up feelings. (Wood, 1968, p. 9)

Religion, festivals, or songs were also identified by Wood as potential "oblique outlets" for the "frustrations" of Trinidadians (1968, p. 302).<sup>9</sup> This does not, as van Koningsbruggen (1997) has noted, offer a solution to all national problems, but it provides an opportunity for the collective expression of harmony rather than difference.

This atmosphere of *communitas*<sup>10</sup> creates the illusion or translates the ideal of national identity. What is more, as a powerful and eloquent social statement, the festival provides those cultural attributes by which this ideal can be experienced as a tangible reality by the people of Trinidad. "Trinidad: The Rainbow that is Real" is the slogan which the tourist board propagates. Nowhere is the colour spectrum of the rainbow as bright as in carnival. (van Koningsbruggen, 1997, p. 271)

Football has an interesting place alongside ritualistic practice such as carnival, both deploying some of its key cultural features in its fan base, and in its performance



aspirations, symbolizing a newer, in-touch and more modern popular cultural profile. There is no intention in this article to underplay such positive cultural realities: accounts of this abound (see, e.g., Woitalla, 2006) commenting on the national enthusiasm—including the prime minister's declaration of a national holiday—that greeted Trinidad and Tobago's qualification for Germany 2006. Following is one blog publication to warm the heart of Warner and his family:

The World Cup in Germany was awesome. Best holiday ever. The country was so well organised and it was a festival of football, much like a carnival with everyone in T-shirt bands and full of good vibes. Trinidad and Tobago were everyone's second team so with my allegiance focused on my mum's island of birth . . . everyone we met wanted to talk about the twin islands in the sun. (Retrieved September 18, 2006, from <http://gimmeculture.blogspot.com/2006/09/jack-warner.html>)

In the final section, the consequences of such popular cultural crossover and elision are discussed.

## Conclusion: Football for Whom?

We have come to believe that Jack Warner's philosophy might well be "Football for All." Why else would he care about people in the Turks and Caicos, British Virgin Islands, Bahamas, Grenada, Montserrat, and so on when there are the big boys of the Football Confederation who are world powers? If he were only interested in results and world placing, more attention and assistance would be given to those national associations that could achieve this for him. Instead, we and many other small national associations who most believe do not deserve the attention given, get it, and are made to not only feel a part of the family, but an important part of the family. How else, other than "Football for All," can you describe this? (CONCACAF, 2002, p. 6)

Why, and how, indeed? This is a serious question, posed though it is by an anonymous person, very possibly a beneficiary of Warner's largesse. But to answer it requires a recontextualization of the Trinidad and Tobago football story. Much is made of the place of sport in the process of nation building, and of course, in the case of Ireland and the Gaelic Athletic Association and the bodyline cricket controversy between Australia and England in the 1930s, such emphases are warranted. C. L. R. James also made The West Indies case. In *Beyond a Boundary*, James (1963/1976) showed that cricketing issues, such as who should be given the captaincy of the West Indian cricket team, could fuel popular opinion and protest, even producing crowd disturbances that stopped a match against England/MCC (Marylebone Cricket Club, a.k.a. England) in January 1960 (p. 218). James went on, in a chapter entitled "*Vox Populi*" to catalog numerous cases of Caribbean protests about sporting selections and captaincy, making the claim that sport has the capacity to articulate a national

consciousness, and formulating his oft-quoted question: "What do they know of cricket who only cricket know?"<sup>11</sup>

The prime minister of the colony at the time, 2.5 years before the implementation of the Independence Constitution, was Eric Williams. He apologized to the MCC and to the England team for the crowd incidents. In his own history of the emergence of the nation and its peoples, he made no mention of sport, yet recognized the importance of "popular celebrations" (Williams, 1964, pp. 186-187) and the threat that the popular vitality of carnival and the boisterousness of the processions in the Indian celebration of Hosea posed for the authorities of the late nineteenth century. Post-independence, Williams argued, Trinidad and Tobago must exploit the "fundamental underlying unity" (p. 278) of its society: a unity based on the population's common experience, despite ethnic difference, as "victims of the same subordination" (p. 278). Ways must be found, urged Williams, to build a nation, a society, a homeland: "Only together can they succeed" (p. 279). The bonding potential of sport in such building is obvious—in James's words, sport was "one of the most urgent needs" in the process of "integration into a national community" (James, 1963/1976, p. 243)—and Williams himself referred to this blending of politics and sport in a political address (James, 1963/1976, p. 233). And yet, Williams cautioned, Trinidad and Tobago had one "overwhelming disadvantage" to overcome, borne of a form of social climbing and political ingratiation that characterized the country and the culture: "pronounced materialism and disastrous individualism" (Williams, 1964, p. 281) have spread throughout the society, he wrote, widely recognized across the Caribbean as in an extreme form in the case of Trinidad and Tobago. Nationalism and self-government was seen by some as an opportunity for self-aggrandizement and clique building. What Williams foresaw here was the continuation of forms of self-promoting hypocrisy that, paradoxically, democratic structures can spawn still more: a situation in which public declarations do not match private aspirations and in which collective responsibility is a sham in the unaccountability of pseudo-democratic bureaucracy. This is a climate of greed as well as unaccountability: in Marseille in 1998 Warner could even claim that his hotel room had been burgled, £60,000 of his wife's jewelry stolen (Sugden & Tomlinson, 2003, p. 250). FIFA's insurance was on hand to compensate.

MacDonald (1986) identified the period between 1977 and 1980 in Trinidad as one of economic and consumer revolution and cited a *Business Latin America* issue of the time: "Trinidadians seem to have an unlimited appetite for consumer goods" (MacDonald, 1986, p. 193). Suburban shopping malls north of Port of Spain emerged as evidence of North American consumer culture. Here, we see the widespread link between democratic progress and consumer possibilities. But, MacDonald cautioned, "serious problems existed, one of the foremost being corruption. Corruption was fairly widespread, permeating all levels of the economy. In a bureaucracy where decisions were often made on a case-by-case basis," there were delays (p. 194). Red tape and self-important bureaucrats slowed things down. So "bribes were and are

common” (p. 195). The growth of football was, in this sense, just another emergent cultural industry, ripe for the exploitative pickings of the alert opportunist. It was the perfect moment for Jack Warner, speaking on behalf of the postcolonial aspirations of the populace, to move from history teaching to history making.<sup>12</sup>

In this context, football symbolizes all that is modern and cosmopolitan, encapsulating what Demas (1971) called the challenge of constructing the “new Caribbean man.”<sup>13</sup> Football, the world game, offering supra-national links and global networks, could be claimed as the quintessential new Caribbean popular (and egalitarian) culture. The Reggae Boyz of Jamaica paved the way: the Soca Warriors could keep the trail blazing, taking ludic elements of the popular cultural forms of past and present on to the world stage of a World Cup Finals, where the very remoteness and impossibility of victory guaranteed the appositeness of the party mood and the celebration of the Carnival.

As native Trinidadian and Tobagon fans welcomed their country’s qualification for Germany 2006, and families and descendents warmed the freezing streets of West London in the team’s lively defeat of Iceland in a World Cup year warm-up, Jack Warner could content himself with a good decade and a half’s work. Hundreds of red and black Soca Warriors flags were brandished in the crowd, and calypso music accompanied the procession of players, each holding a child’s hand, onto the pitch. Warner could afford to turn a deaf ear to the PA when a chorus of boos greeted the announcement that the teams were to be presented to him. For by now he had left history school teaching far behind and used the popular passion for sport and national aspiration to fuel his own ambitions and pleasures. Safely gated in the Five Rivers Howell Settlement of luxurious Arouca, snugly inland from the more tempestuous waters of Port of Spain and the CONCACAF offices, he was just a few minutes’ drive from the monument to one of his main mentors, the Dr. João Havelange Centre of Excellence, a mere few cricket ball throws away from the erstwhile Tunapuna cricket ground where C. L. R. James had first learned the character-building power and social benefits of sport. The bust of Havelange overshadowing the ghost of James became a fitting image with which to capture the transformation of sport’s cultural values and political economy in an age of get-rich-quick exploitation of the possibilities of sport. Who’s going to stop this Carnival?

## Notes

1. The first period dates for almost 300 years, from 1498, when Columbus discovered the islands for the King of Spain, to 1797. Spanish rule decimated the aboriginal Indians and neglected development. Britain conquered the territories in 1797 and until the end of the First World War, the British established and ruled through a plantation system based first on slavery and then the importation of Indian indentured laborers. Later in this second phase, a “struggle for representative government” (Ryan, 1972, p. 5) emerged, and by the end of the nineteenth century, a politically conscious “Negro working class” was established within the political landscape. A third phase from 1919 to 1936 saw the Reform movement grow under Back leadership, and some elected representatives were allowed on to the Governor’s Legislative Council in 1925,

but there were no popularly elected assemblies until 1961. In 1937, a general strike marked the beginning of a fourth phase when a new level of mass political consciousness and political leadership gained by Negroes and Indians, heralded constitutional and socioeconomic changes throughout the Caribbean. This phase, from 1937 to 1946, was characterized in its later World War II years by a temporary cessation of agitation.

2. Such research is often a matter of stumbling into cul-de-sacs as well as following fruitful leads. In 2002, my personal visits to the CONCACAF headquarters in Port of Spain were never acknowledged by confederation president Jack Warner or any of his staff. Back in England, a few months later and a short while before the publication of *Badfellas* (Sugden & Tomlinson, 2003), I received a phone call in my university office. It was from Emanuel Maradas, editor of *African Soccer* and widely perceived as Blatter's man in Africa. "I am quoted in your book," he said. "Can you get a copy to me?" "It's out soon," I responded, "so you will be able to buy one." Maradas changed the topic, asking, "How was the West Indies?" "Oh, you know that I've recently returned, then?" "We have our people," muttered Maradas. There are less exciting, but also less chilling, ways of conducting research, but if we are to track and understand the power networks in international sport, we must be ready to feel the weight of surveillance from those who might have much to lose.

3. At the beginning of Jack Douglas's 1976 book on investigative research is a quote from Thucydides's *The Peloponnesian War*: "Not that even so the truth was easy to discover: different eye witnesses give different accounts of the same events, speaking out of partiality for one side or the other or else from imperfect memories." Here, Douglas turns to classical literature to reaffirm an ancient interpretive principle, and the important word in the quotation is not so much "different" or "imperfect" but "partiality." For Douglas (1976),

using basic ideas of truth, we find that the social world in which we live, especially American society, is a complex, conflictual, and problematic world in which people, both unintentionally and purposefully, often (but not always) construct complex ways of hiding important parts of their lives from the outside public, especially researchers. Social research methods must always be constructed in accord with the basic ideas of truth and the basic goal of achieving truth in this kind of social world. (p. 3)

Within Douglas's investigative framework, then, there is no absolute truth but rather a "multiperspective conception of truth." And it is not to scientific methods and replicable techniques that the investigative Douglas turns in his quest for such truths, as follows:

Only a tiny fraction of the information collected and social research done in our society is collected or done by sociologists or by people who have seriously studied sociology. Most social research information is discovered by social research done by people of practical affairs, such as journalists collecting information through interviews, writers doing life stories by taping long talks with the subjects, retired politicians writing memoirs or publishing diaries, businessmen trying to determine the profitability of a new housing development or a new toothpaste, government officials trying to determine public response to a new schedule of bus fares or the amount of crime, and so on almost endlessly. (Douglas, 1976, p. 14)

This is not a program for systematic research methods training in graduate schools of social science (Sugden & Tomlinson, 1999a). What it is, though, is a realistic appraisal of the nature of knowledge generation in advanced liberal, democratic consumerist societies. And Douglas's arguments lie within a well-established critical tradition in North American cultural criticism, journalism, and campaigning sociology (and comparable streams of critical oppositional and investigative traditions in other countries). The roots of the investigative tradition lie within the muckraking tradition of journalistic writing in the United States in the first decade of the twentieth century, when "investigation and exposure, watchdog functions of a democratic press" (Kaplan, 1975, p. 151) characterized the investigations and writings of a generation of

journalists—and novelists such as Upton Sinclair—who prompted reform and intervention by the federal government in the ruthless and exploitative practices of giant industries. Insurance companies, railroads, the liquor business, and the medicine and meat industries were all exposed and opened up to the reforming regulatory zeal of the U.S. president, Theodore Roosevelt. Lincoln Steffens, from 1901 editing the *McClure's Magazine* (monthly circulation 360,000), was the most prominent of such journalists, “the publicly recognized leader of a movement that was at the peak of its influence at the beginning of 1906” (Kaplan, 1975, p. 146). The investigative muckraking tradition was later complemented by a radical strain of critical writing best embodied in the figure of Randolph Bourne. Bourne’s essays for the *New Republic* from 1914 included “The Undergraduate,” in which he bemoaned the fraternity-dominated college life based on a “sporting attitude which is anathema to an intellectual, inquiring life” (Bourne, 1977, pp. 212-215).

The muckraking metaphor, cited by Roosevelt in 1906 when turning against the critical tide of those investigative and radical writers who had fueled his political agenda, is from English radical Parliamentarian, religious thinker, and writer John Bunyan. In his spiritual allegory *Pilgrim's Progress*, Bunyan (1678/1998) wrote of the muck-raking man as one who digs up all before him in selfish fashion: “a man that could look no way but downwards, with a Muckrake in his hand” (p. 164). The man with the Muck-rake ignores an offer to exchange his Muck-rake for a Celestial Crown, “but raked to himself the Straws, the small Sticks, and Dust of the Floor” (Bunyan, 1678/1998, p. 164). With the Muck-raker as his reference point, and cross-referencing Proverbs 30.8 of the Holy Bible—“Give me not riches”—Bunyan then raises the question of how to look for earthly things is to turn away from God. Roosevelt used the muckraking metaphor in a way that has been challenged, as noted by Jensen (2004, pp. 431-432): The muckraker of Bunyan’s allegory was the wealthy greedy figure raking the earth for more riches. Calling those who exposed the wealthy and the unaccountable muckrakers was a misinterpretation of the Bunyan text. It got things the wrong way round: “John D. Rockefeller was king of the muckrakers, not Lincoln Steffens” (Jensen, 2004, p. 432). But the term has come to refer to the investigative missions of the successors of Steffens: the process of searching out and revealing scandal, particularly in relation to the famous and the privileged and powerful. Steffens himself felt badly let down by the President, seeing Roosevelt’s speeches on the theme as an attack “on a group of writers who helped make him a reform hero” (Kaplan, 1975, p. 149). Within the academy and academic research departments in the universities—and the Chicago School sociologists of the University of Chicago became the most preeminent example—this tradition of investigative work became recognized as a significant element of the sociological project (Marx, 1972), however marginalized in cycles of methodological fashion and orthodoxy.

4. This letter is available on the Web site for investigative journalist Andrew Jennings ([www.transparencyinsport.org](http://www.transparencyinsport.org)). In addition to the Ernst & Young letter, the site includes selected features from Jennings’s *Daily Mail* reportage.

5. Zen-Ruffinen left FIFA after Blatter’s reelection in 2002. He signed a silence pledge on FIFA matters but has campaigned for the anti-corruption initiative Transparency International (Menary, 2006).

6. This slogan was taken from a Trinidad and Tobago Tourist Board match program promotional feature for a match between Trinidad and Tobago versus Iceland, Tuesday, February 28, 2006.

7. Lest this abolition be seen as an immediately liberating force, it is worth listening to a commentator of the time (in 1838): “1834...August 1st. This day was a remarkable epoch in the British colonies. Slavery was abolished and what is called *praedial* and *nonpraedial* apprenticeship was substituted. The negroes of Trinidad, on this occasion, behaved less riotously than those of some of the neighbouring colonies. The greatest difficulty was in making them comprehend the difference between slavery and...apprenticeship; they showed much resistance, but this, in most cases, was of a passive nature. The use of the cat-o’-nine tails [showed] some of the most refractory that they were in the wrong, and the rest returned to their duty, patiently to await the four or six years probation” (Joseph, 1970, pp. 258-259).

8. To expand historically, on how in the 1840s carnival began to take on its modern form in Trinidad:

Carnival...was made their own by the former slaves. They transformed it from what it had become in Trinidad, a genteel and coquettish diversion of the Roman Catholic upper classes, into what such a celebration had been in antiquity, a living folk festival in which the participants could purge

themselves of emotions held in check for the rest of the year...Carnival gave the Negro Creoles the chance to express a corporate pride in their own values and at the same time to ridicule the pretensions of the upper classes. Its fantasies enabled them to be kings for the day and to assume for a short time the '*persona*' of other beings, real or imaginary, with envied attributes. Its opportunities for unrestricted behaviour left the emotions spent and satisfied. (Wood, 1968, p. 8)

The history of Carnival is one of repression, remaking, adaptation, contestation, and consensus. Pearce (1956) identified some of the early disputes in the nature of the event. Stewart (1988) provided a more anthropological perspective on the modern period.

9. Some writers (see, e.g., St. Pierre, 1973b) have offered this sort of cathartic analysis in relation to cricket. But no sport, including cricket, was included by Wood in his seminal study, although Cowley (1996) has traced the historical minutiae of carnival ritual and practice, including a burlesque cricket match documented at the 1869 Carnival. Later analysts have generally concurred with Wood on the cultural centrality of the Carnival. Some have been drawn into hyperbole: Hill (1972, p. 3) hailed Carnival as "the greatest annual theatrical spectacle of all time." Others are more sober in their assessment. For Mason (1998), Carnival "brings together nearly all aspects of Trinidad's cultural identity and speaks volumes about its attitudes to religion, music, language, humour, folk traditions, politics, male-female relations, its lively ethnic mix and even its food and sport" (pp. 170-171). It has kept alive African roots, defined a "complex cultural and national identity after independence" and shown how "a resilient people have managed to create a healthy society out of adversity." Its 2-day model is "a triumph of popular culture" (p. 171).

10. In the words of Victor Turner (1982, p. 21), *communitas* is "a perception of shared emotional states" linked with a de-emphasis of "functions associated with social structuring." Lewin (1983, p. 33) has shown how music is another cultural context in which an atmosphere of *communitas* can be engendered, sometimes specially used as a kind of psychic force inducing trance states.

11. James continues, "West Indians crowding to tests bring with them the whole past history and future hopes of the islands. English people have a conception of themselves breathed from birth. Drake and mighty Nelson, Shakespeare, Waterloo, the Charge of the Light Brigade, the few who did so much for so many, the success of parliamentary democracy, those and such as those constitute a national tradition. Underdeveloped countries have to go back centuries to rebuild one. We of the West Indies have none at all, none that we know of. To such people the three W's, Ram and Val wrecking English batting, help to fill a huge gap in their consciousness and in their needs" (James, 1963/1976, p. 225). James's often-idealistic commitment to cricket's potential for the expression of desirable human values is unraveled in a fascinating article by Smith (2006).

12. Warner has been capable of pleading the postcolonial case, as recollected by former FA secretary Graham Kelly. On one campaigning trip when England was bidding to get the 2006 World Cup finals, Warner was "quite demanding. He would want work permits, he would want every consideration being given for work permit applications for players from that region and he wouldn't hesitate to ask. It is a pain. You are going out there to meet them and he wants special favours. It's very difficult...I found it very difficult" (Sugden & Tomlinson, 2003, p. 251). Difficult or not, during the next few years, players from Trinidad and Tobago began to get their work permits. One Wrexham fan, Kevin Jones, mailed me after I gave a version of this paper in London, writing: "A couple of years back Mr. Jack Warner personally intervened to get work permits for two or three of our Trinidad and Tobago internationals—so I can appreciate his good points. I was just wondering if he might have links with the players' agent Mike Berry and whether he may have benefited financially from Carlos Edwards and Hector Sam moving to North Wales?" Asked in Germany in July 2006 whether he was still a consultant to the TTFF, Mike Berry answered, "No. My appointment as TTFF consultant UK/Europe was for the 2006 World Cup only and terminated at the end of last month...a great honour, experience and a journey I will never forget" (Mohammed, 2006). (A lucrative journey, too, no doubt.) Kevin Jones also posed a crucial conundrum: "However, it does amaze me that a man with so many fingers in so many pies can rule the roost so completely, a man whose building company helped build the João Havelange Centre and the Dwight Yorke

stadium (with money from the GOAL project perhaps).” One answer lies in how a figure like Warner can exploit history in his favor. Graham Kelly, again, said, “On the first morning of our visit in Trinidad, Warner gave us a dressing-down, saying things like, ‘You are widely perceived as imperialistic, you British lot. You’ve got a very bad attitude towards us downtrodden colonials: you’re stuck up, imperialistic’” (Sugden & Tomlinson, 2003, p. 251). Kelly chuckled as he added that Warner then asked for work permits and for a fixture for the Jamaican national side at Wembley. Playing the historical record in this way, Warner effects a form of emotional diplomatic blackmail: Another way of answering Kevin Jones’s question would take us into the realms of the psychological: Warner as bully boy. Certainly writers must be wary: Liburd (2006) called Warner merely “a controversial figure” after having himself done much to reveal the extent of Warner’s insider dealing; Radnege’s (2006, p. 46) review of Jennings’s *Foul!* acknowledges how effectively Jennings “gets his teeth into CONCACAF and his old target” Warner, but Radnege himself backs off from the detail. The old adage that the journalist must preserve future access comes to mind here.

13. For whom there are three tasks: this man must first come to terms with his history, but his second “great task... is the creation of a distinctive Caribbean society” (p. 9), and a third task is to be selective in contact with the metropolis in ideology, culture, and values as well as economics (Demas, 1971, p. 10).

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