Robbie knew of Jamaat threat
By Andre Bagoo (Newsday).
Saturday, October 29 2011
THERE were clear warnings on the “sinister” activities of the Jamaat al Muslimeem which former Prime Minister ANR Robinson should have picked up on in the months and weeks leading to the events of 1990, former Special Branch deputy director of Police Mervyn Guiseppi said yesterday.
Testifying at the commission of enquiry into the events of July 1990, Guiseppi said the Special Branch – the country’s then premiere security body – issued a series of reports warning the former prime minister and a former minister of National Security of the “sinister designs” of the Jamaat, which included plans to take action against the State in “early 1990” and to assassinate unspecified NAR Cabinet members.
The Special Branch, Guiseppi said, had clear information that the Jamaat were a threat to national security and to the stability of the government long before July 1990.
This information was communicated to Robinson and the minister of National Security at an unspecified date after 1987 and before the 1990 attempted insurrection unfolded.
“I can say so categorically,” Guiseppi said when asked whether the Special Branch had made known its views to the political directorate. “It was sent to the prime minister and the minister of National Security.”
Asked by enquiry counsel Avory Sinanan SC if anyone acted on the reports, Guiseppi said, “No. To the best of my knowledge the persons concerned did not act on them.”
“They ought to have drawn the links. They ought to have tied the dots together,” he added.
Among the information which the Special Branch had gathered were reports which showed that:
– in 1989 Jamaat henchman Bilal Abdullah held a meeting with eight Jamaat members informing them they would take action to attempt a coup in “early 1990”;
– members of the Islamic sect were planning to assassinate several NAR Cabinet members and this was, according to some reports, linked to the shooting at a car carrying the wife of the then president Noor Hassanali, Zalayhar. There was a report that the car carrying the wife of the president was mistaken for Robinson’s car.
– Jamaat leader Abu Bakr, by 1986/1987, was travelling to Libya, a country with open sympathies for terrorists; 25 Jamaat members were sent for training in Libya;
– eight members of the Defence Force and “four or five” members of the Police Service had joined with the Jamaat and there was an “aggressive” membership drive with camps at mosques and forested areas including Rio Claro; Cumaca; Toco; and Blanchisseuse.
– as far back as 1982, Bakr was seeking to smuggle guns into the country and AK 47s were found at a St James mosque.
So much information came in, Guiseppi said, the Special Branch held a meeting on the Wednesday before the July 27 events because it had come to the view that an attack was “imminent”.
“The Wednesday before the coup, I held a weekly meeting with all the members of the Special Branch,” he said. “We knew it was imminent... We would not tell the political directorate that it would happen at 6 pm on July 27, but we knew it was happening. We had no doubt, absolutely no doubt in our minds that a coup was imminent.”
Guiseppi, who was the deputy head of the Special Branch at the time, said he did not communicate this view over the imminence of the threat but noted that responsibility would have fallen to the then Special Branch head Dalton Harvey.
Guiseppi said he was not willing to put his head on a block to confirm that Harvey had warned Robinson directly, but this was “more than likely.”
Guiseppi noted that the Special Branch ascertained that one month after the NAR came into power in 1986, the Jamaat’s resentment for the government intensified with the Jamaat claiming the NAR had reneged on promises made on the 1986 campaign trail. He said there was never any information of the Jamaat assisting the NAR during its 1986 campaign.
The Special Branch noted public comments and threats made by Bakr and took them seriously, he said. Guiseppi said Special Branch forwarded reports to the political directorate in relation to Bakr’s trips to Libya. Bakr, he said, was linked to Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s so-called Caribbean plan. (Gaddafi was slain on October 20, 2011 by rebels in Libya.)
“By 1986/1987 it was known to the world that Libya had 20 training camps and had been sponsoring terrorist activity worldwide, welcoming hijackers, providing logistical support. Libya was also accused of using diplomatic cover to transport arms and ammunition and to give terrorists passports.” This, he said, should have raised the alarm.
“It ought to have rung a bell in the heads of the political directorate,” he said. “That should have sent up some red flags.”
There were clear gaps in security measures to track nationals visiting countries of special interest such as Libya, he indicated.
In relation to the plots to kill members of the NAR Cabinet, Special Branch had intelligence suggesting that the Jamaat had placed Cabinet members under surveillance. This information, he said, was passed on to the “political directorate”.
“I indicated that they had sinister designs,” he said. “In plain language they were making preliminary moves to assassinate them.” He said there was intelligence which suggested that these plans may have been behind an incident which occurred involving Zalayhar Hassanali’s car when unknown persons opened fire. He said some information suggested that the attackers mistook the car for the prime minister’s.
“There were conflicting reports,” he said. “Some information suggested that. We have several theories. In one report it was thought to have been as a consequence of a family dispute.” He was unsure if any arrests were ever made but noted a person may have been picked up in the course of the investigation.
In 1982, Bakr had become Jamaat leader.
“Shortly after that in the same year, we would get information of attempts to get arms,” he said. All of the information was shared. “Not to do so would be to assume that we were collaborating with the Jamaat al Muslimeen,” he said. “It would have been inconceivable.”
At one stage, reports from agents intensified.
“Because of the proliferation of reports we were getting; we used to send the monthly intelligence report on a weekly basis,” Guiseppi said.
The enquiry continues on Monday at the Caribbean Court of Justice, Henry Street, Port-of-Spain.