The Ventour report
Trinidad Express
Sunday, June 17th 2007On March 5 this year, the State's criminal case against Chief Justice Sat Sharma fell dramatically after the main witness, Chief Magistrate Sherman McNicolls, refused to have his evidence tested under cross-examination.
Three days later, members of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission met in a specially convened meeting at the Hall of Justice to determine allegations of misconduct against Chief Magistrate McNicolls. They agreed to appoint Justice Sebastian Ventour investigating officer. He concluded his enquiry and on April 11 this year submitted a six-page report, under cover of confidentiality to the JLSC.
Following is the full Ventour Report:
Allegation of Misconduct
The allegation of misconduct made against Chief Magistrate Sherman McNicolls is that without reasonable excuse he acted in a manner that was prejudicial to the administration of justice in that" he, Sherman McNicolls, Chief Magistrate, on the 5th day of March, 2007 at the Fourth Court, Port of Spain Magistrate's Court, presided over by her Worship Lianne Lee Kim refused to allow himself to be cross-examined on the statements he had made to the police in relation to the criminal proceedings Sergeant Romany -v- Satnarine Sharma for attempting to pervert the course of justice which statements had been tendered in the said proceedings and formed part of the evidence and which resulted in the said proceedings being discontinued.
An allegation of misconduct against a Chief Magistrate in the context of the particulars described above is a matter of grave concern for the administration of justice. In considering the allegations two questions need to be answered:
(1) Does the refusal of the Chief Magistrate to allow himself to be cross-examined on the statements he had made to the police in relation to the criminal proceedings against the Honourable Chief Justice Satnarine Sharma amount to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice?
If the answer to question one is in the affirmative then
(2) Did the Chief Magistrate advance any reasons which may justify his decision not to be cross-examined in the said criminal proceedings?
One of the primary functions of the judiciary is to build and sustain public confidence in the administration of justice. Therefore that can be no gainsaying that when judicial officers conduct themselves in a manner, which is prejudicial to the administration of justice, then public confidence in the system could be seriously eroded.
The Chief Magistrate's conduct
On the information before me there is absolutely no dispute that the Chief Magistrate refused to be cross-examined in the criminal proceedings held before presiding Magistrate Lianne Lee Kim on 5th day of March, 2007 in the case of Sergeant Romany -v- Satnarine Sharma. The Chief Magistrate has himself admitted to such conduct in the written explanation he submitted on 21 March, 2007. The decision not to be cross-examined must be viewed in an historical perspective in order to determine whether the conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
In his explanation the Chief Magistrate confirmed that he had made a complaint to the Prime
REPORT from Page 3
Minister concerning the conduct of the Honourable Chief Justice and that when he did so it was with the clear intention of having the matter dealt with under Section 137 of the Constitution. The Chief Magistrate further said that he never contemplated criminal proceedings against the Chief Justice.
Indeed, it is difficult to appreciate the Chief Magistrate's statement that he never contemplated criminal proceedings against the Chief Justice. If it is that the Chief Justice is alleged to have conducted himself in a manner which is not only improper but contrary to law (as the Chief Magistrate himself had concluded, which is why he took the matter to the Prime Minister in the first place) then it cannot be for the Chief Magistrate to determine the parameters as to how the wrong doer is to be dealt with by the law. That is a matter for the police. Whether or not the Chief Magistrate contemplated criminal proceedings when the complaint was laid is therefore totally irrelevant to any subsequent prosecution of the perpetrator.
In the events that followed, the allegation of wrongdoing was intensely investigated by the police and several statements were recorded, including statements by the Chief Magistrate himself. The police acting on the advice of the Director of Public Prosecutions found that the Honourable Chief Justice committed a criminal offence and on July 14, 2006 the police preferred a charge of attempting to pervert the course of public justice against the Chief Justice at the Port of Spain Magistrate's Court.
The statement received from the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions confirmed that throughout the preparation of the case they (the police) had received the fullest cooperation from the Chief Magistrate, who, on the morning of February 14, 2007 swore to four statements knowing that the statements were to be tendered into evidence and that he (the Chief Magistrate) is likely to be cross-examined on the evidence tendered.
In all of this it must not be forgotten that the person accused of the criminal offence was the Chief Justice of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and that a criminal charge was laid as a result of the complaint made by the Chief Magistrate against the said Chief Justice, who, while the charge was pending was not allowed to perform his duties as Chief Justice.,
The circumstances surrounding the Chief Justice's arrest had been argued before the Privy Council and in many respects the case was seen as unprecedented in the Commonwealth jurisdiction.
On March 5, 2007 when the matter was called before the presiding Magistrate Mr Gilbert Peterson, SC, Lead Counsel for the Prosecution indicated to the Magistrate that he was adopting a particular course in the matter and was not proceeding any further with the prosecution because of the position taken by the Chief Magistrate. Mr McNicolls, the Chief Magistrate, had taken the decision not to allow himself to be cross-examined on the sworn statements he had made and which was tendered into evidence on behalf of the prosecution. The case against the Chief Justice collapsed as a result of the Chief Magistrate's action. The presiding magistrate then discharged the Honourable Chief Justice. He was never given the opportunity to test the credibility of his accuser by way of cross-examination on the statements the Chief Magistrate had made to the police in relation to the criminal proceedings.
In my respectful view, it would appear that the Chief Magistrate's decision not to allow himself to be cross-examined in the criminal proceedings may have compromise the rule of law and the administration of justice. Clearly the decision has led to a waste of human and financial resources and has succeeded in sending the wrong message to the general public.
Is there justification for the Chief Magistrate's decision
It is therefore necessary to examine the reasons articulated by the Chief Magistrate for his decision not to allow himself to be cross-examined on the statements he made to the police in the matter. On the day following his decision, that is, the 6th March, 2007 the Chief Magistrate issued a press release seeking to justify his decision not to be cross-examined in the case against the Chief Justice. In the press release the Chief Magistrate alluded to certain remarks made by the Privy Council "about the existence of parallel proceedings" and about his eagerness "to give evidence in the proper forum in relation to the Sharma matter".
While it is true that the Chief Magistrate did not elaborate on some of the statements he made in the press release it was clear that he was concerned about the coexistence of the impeachment proceedings (pursuant to Section 137 of the Constitution) and criminal proceedings in which he was being called upon to submit himself for cross-examination. He then went further to express the view that it was improper for him to be cross-examined in two separate proceedings and that since the impeachment proceedings should have priority over the criminal proceedings he was prepared to testify and be subjected to cross-examination only in the impeachment proceedings.
The Chief Magistrate was a little more specific in his explanation when he said that he had discovered upon his examination of the Privy Council's decision (I believe that his reference to the Court of Appeal, may have been an error) in the Sharma's case, their Lordships had made some negative remarks about the existence of parallel proceedings. As a consequence, he held the view that the existence of both sets of proceedings would amount to oppressive conduct and that he was not prepared to participate in any such proceedings against that were oppressive.
I have carefully read the judgment handed down by the Privy Council on 30th November, 2006 in the Sharma's appeal. I have not been able to find any negative remarks made by their Lordships about the existence of parallel proceedings amounting to oppressive conduct. I have noted however the dicta made by Lord Bingham and Lord Walker in paragraph 2 of their decision where it is stated as follows:
"In practical terms the question is whether the decision to prosecute the Chief Justice, by who so ever made, should be examined by way of judicial review or whether the criminal process (subject to any application the Chief Justice may hereafter make) should at this stage be allowed to take its course. It is not suggested that both processes can be pursued at the same time (Emphasis added).
Implicit in the last sentence is the argument that it may be wrong to pursue proceedings in two separate actions against an accuser in respect of the same complaint. The Privy Council however, was there referring to the judicial review proceedings filed by the Chief Justice on the one hand and the criminal proceedings against the Chief Justice on the other.
It has not been disclosed what information the Chief Magistrate was privy to in order to make the determination that there were in existence parallel proceedings when he wrote to the Director of Public Prosecutions by letter dated 13th February, 2007 requesting that "immediate steps" be taken to stay the criminal proceedings against the Chief Justice. It is public knowledge that the Prime Minister's letter to the Chief Justice requesting a written response to the complaint was forwarded to the Chief Justice on 21st February, 2007. When the Chief Magistrate wrote the Director of Public Prosecutions on 13th February, 2007 there was no parallel proceedings in existence. The Chief Magistrate must have appreciated that based on the response of the Chief Justice the probability exists that the Prime Minister may have decided (based on advice) not to proceed any further with the impeachment proceedings. Requesting a stay of the proceedings in the circumstances was therefore premature.
Moreover, when the Chief Magistrate decided on 5th March, 2007 not to allow himself to be cross-examined the Chief Justice had not yet responded to the Prime Minister's letter of 21st February, 2007. Even at that stage it could hardly be said that there were in existence parallel proceedings. I think the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions quite properly concluded that the reasons articulated by the Chief Magistrate in support of the decision not to be cross-examined were therefore untenable. See her letter of the 5th March, 2007.
Another of the Chief Magistrate's reasons for refusing to be cross-examined as stated in his letter of 13th February, 2007 was his concern about "my junior officers being put in a dilemma to adjudicate on a matter concerning my testimony..." Did the Chief Magistrate resent the thought of having to appear before one of his subordinates at the criminal proceedings? What dilemma is he referring to? His subordinates have all taken an oath to administer the laws of the land without fear or favour. His concern about "his junior officers being put into a dilemma" cannot support his decision not to allow himself to be cross-examined in the criminal proceedings.
Having said that, the Chief Magistrate may have fallen into serious error in failing to appreciate his role in the criminal proceedings. He was simply a witness who happened to be the Chief Magistrate. As a witness he was not being called upon to render any judgment based on "precedent and facts." As a witness he was not the one to decide which of the proceedings (whether impeachment or criminal) was to take precedent over the other. At the material time he was not wearing the hat of Chief Magistrate and therefore it was not his responsibility nor was it within his power to decide whether it was "improper both in principle and in law to allow for the cross examination of evidence in two separate proceedings which were at roughly the same stage in their development." Sadly enough, that was not his call.
It seems to me that the matters which informed the decision of the Chief Magistrate not to be cross-examined are matters which ought to have been properly put before the Director of Public Prosecutions and/or Lead Counsel Mr Gilbert Peterson, SC for their consideration and decision. The Chief Magistrate laboured under a serious misapprehension as to his proper role as the main witness in the criminal proceedings. Having himself for a lawyer he was ill advised and his actions may very well have compromised the rule of law and the administration of justice.
Whether the Chief Magistrate should be charged with an offence having regard to all the circumstances, is a matter within the sole discretion of the Commission pursuant to sub-regulation (6) of the Regulations.
It is indeed mind boggling to hear the Chief Magistrate's state in his EXPLANATION that "if the Director of Public Prosecutions' lawyers or the presiding Magistrate had indicated to me that my reasons for testifying were not accepted I WOULD HAVE TESTIFIED".
I have declined to comment on the minor contradictions emanating in the Chief Magistrate's EXPLANATION and the statement submitted by the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions on the facts leading up to the Chief Magistrate decision not to be cross-examined. I decline to do so because those contradictions are of no relevance to the ultimate decision taken by the Chief Magistrate.
My report is submitted for the Commission's consideration.
Dated this 11th day of April, 2007.